The Role of International Actors in Resolving Somalia Conflict and the Peace Agreements Since 1991

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Abstract— The paper emphasized on examining the role of international actors in resolving the Somalia conflict and the peace processes since 1991. The paper employed qualitative research approach. It used secondary source of data such as books, journal articles, and conference papers. There was an exhaustive civil war in Somalia since 1991. There were several reasons for the raising of the conflict. Still, Somalia is politically instable country. Consequently, the international actors involved to settle the conflict. The United Nations, African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, United States of America, and Ethiopia tried to resolve the conflict and establish stable Somalia state. There were different peace agreements to settle the conflict. However, the peace agreement did not achieve the expected goals. Now a day, Somalia has its own central government but the government is not strong enough to administer the territory effectively. As a result, the security problems of Horn of Africa are arising from Somalia.

Keywords— International Actors, Role, Somalia, Conflict, Resolving, Peace Agreement.

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the collapse of the President Siad Barre government in 1991, the Somali conflict has become complex. There were a conflict for controlling political and economic power and also conflict based on clan and so on. For instance, the Darood clan, to which Siad Barre belonged, was hated by the other clans because there are assumed as benefited from widespread corruption fuelled by a large influx of foreign aid and by the country's resources. This situation intensifies the conflict (Roba & Berouk, 2011).

The cause of the Somalia civil war was so complex. The conflict might be grounded in political factors, economic factors, the colonial legacy, and the availability of weapons and so on. The first cause for Somalia conflict is the intense competition for power and resource. For instance, the civil war with in the Hawiye, the Darod, the Digil, and Mirifle,

and the Issaq clans was a resource and/or power motivated conflict (Hammod & Lindely, 2014). In addition, the Abgal and the Habargidir clans had never fought throughout their history and in fact belong to the same clan (Hawiye) and sub-clan (Hiraab). However, when Mogadishu fell to the United Somali Congress (USC) (to which they both belonged) a power struggle broke out between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed which affects most part of Somalia (ibid).

The second cause was the colonial legacy when the Somalia was divided among the British, Italy, and French colonial powers. This led for the polarization of Somalia and for the question of restoring the territories which are under other sovereign states after its independence, for instance, Ogaden in Ethiopia (Lewis, 2008). The partitioning of Somalia permanently damage affect the Somali people. The effect of the partition continues to haunt the Somali people since the two Somali territories remain under the control of Ethiopia and Kenya (Hammod & Lindely, 2014).

Thirdly, the Clan System is a most important and fundamental factor in the Somali conflict. although Somalia is a homogeneous state, clans and sub-clans play a very important role in defining the political, economic and social landscape of Somalia. Over 80 percent of the Somali people are pastoralists who are lacking the culture of a centralized administrative system and promoting loyalty to their kin and clans (Zartman, 1995). The division between clans has also widened over the years due to competition over resources, elite manipulation, and political patronage. For instance, during twenty years in power (1969–1991), Siad Barre introduced a clan based divide and rule policy. Barre developed his own mechanism of appointing loyal political agents from his own clan to guide and control civil and military institutions. Barre's policy instigated suspicion and hatred among the clans and finally led the country into deep civil war and statelessness (ibid).

The war lords and the Islamic fundamentalist groups had emerged in Somalia and led the state to the continuous crisis. Surprisingly, in 2006, the Union of Islamic Court

(UIC) came to take power in Mogadishu and rapidly expanded to the south and central parts of Somalia (ibid). Many formal and informal apparatuses have been used to settle the crisis in Somalia. For instance, in the formal way the peace processes such as the Addis Ababa Conference in 1993, the Arta peace process in 2000, the Eldorate Process in 2004, which gave birth to the first Transitional Federal Government (TFG I) in 2004; the Djibouti Peace Process in 2008 which brought TFG II, and so on were taken (Dagne, 2009).

Moreover, because of the severe crisis in Somalia different international actors had engaged to stabilize the state. In 1992, the United Nations (UN) created a peacekeeping force called United Nations Operations on Somalia (UNOSOM) to restore order in the capital, Mogadishu, and safeguard relief supplies. The United States contributed to the effort with a force called UNITAF. UNITAF withdrew in 1994, and UNOSOM followed suit in 1995 (Duke University, 2007). In addition, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took an initiative to bring peace in Somalia and similarly, Africa Union also took responses. The objective of the paper is analyzing the conflict in Somalia since 1991 and the efforts to resolve the civil war.

II.   THE NATURE OF THE SOMALIA CONFLICT

2.1. The Rise of Warlords in Somalia in 1990s

Following the 1977/1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia, the military officers tried to coup against the Saide Barre government since elites from specific clans controlled the state power, and the economy. But after the aborted coup the Saide Barre government used an excessive force against the Majerteen clan which most of the officers belonged. This event was the beginning for the rising of warlords and the Somalia's civil war. Other clans such as the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye and Digil and Mirifle also started fighting in order to seize power (Elmi & Barisse, 2006).

Therefore, the post-Barre regime was recognized by a prolonged period of violent anarchy and warfare. The most intense period of conflict was during 1991-1992 when the different clan factions from the old regime and the newly emerged opposition militias fought for controlling of land and resources in the south of the country (Lewis, 2008). The armed conflict raged across southern Somalia through 1991 and 1992, fighting clan-based militias against another for control of valuable towns, seaports, and neighborhoods. The wars, which began as struggle for control of the government, quickly degenerated into predatory looting,

banditry, and occupation of valuable real estate by conquering clan militias. Young gunmen fought principally to secure war booty, and were under only the loosest control of militia commanders (ibid). The principal victims of this violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting (Bradbury and Healy, 2010).

There was an intense fight between United Somali Congress (USC) leadership though it was predominately from the Hawiye tribe. The struggle was between the self-appointed president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohamed Farah Aideed. For a year the power struggle afflicted the Somali people with loss of lives and property. The two men's quarrel became everyone's problem. Too often, this is the case in modern-day Somalia (Mohamed, 2009). In 1990s, strong armed movements which struggle for political and economic power had been emerged in Somalia. Among them were: the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerten clan) (Bradbury and Healy, 2010).

2.2. The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia

The historical tendency of armed factions in the country to align themselves with the global agenda for both ideological and strategic purposes has shaped what on the surface could be framed a new insurgency. Since 9/11 this has tended to be considered as terrorism (Roba & Berouk, 2011). In 2004-2006, the UIC was able to control larger territories in the south and central parts of Somalia including Mogadishu and established a resemblance of peace in the areas of their control. On December 24, 2006, Ethiopian and TFG forces launched a successful military attack against the UIC. In less than a week, the Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu and the UIC dissolved and surrendered political leadership to clan leaders (ICJ cited in Kidist, 2009). Later, Al-Shabaab, the military wing of the UIC, started launching attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian forces and also the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (ibid).

III.   THE INFORMAL AND FORMAL APPARATUSES TO RESOLVE THE SOMALIA CONFLICT: POST-1991

3.1. The Informal Mechanisms

Though the informal institutions were almost not successful, they had exerted many efforts in order to solve the Somalia crisis. Among the informal institutions:

3.1.1. The Elders

Traditional elders are an important source to bring reconciliation. In Somalia, following the crisis, many elders have participated in calming the civil war. For instance in

2004, they have involved in the selection of members of parliament so as to influence faction leaders and investing the process with greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali public. Whatever the case, the elders were not effective in bringing solutions particularly in much of southern Somalia because it was difficult for them to counter the financial and military power of faction leaders or their private sector backers (International Crisis Group, 2004).

The elders' reconciliation process was complicated because many elders have been considered as corrupted, co-opted for political purposes or have otherwise blighted the prestige of their office. In such cases, they may no longer represent credible alternatives to faction leaders and their partisans (ibid).

3.1.2. The Civil Society

The civil societies such as NGOs, women's groups, professional associations, academics, and former politicians are other informal institutions which strived to bring peace in Somalia. These civil societies were participating in providing social services but they were not free from the influence of clan and factionalism. In other side though civil society representatives have been present at the talks, it is not always clear whose interest they represent except their own (International Crisis Group, 2004).

3.1.3. The business sectors

Business sectors have also tried to contribute in bringing peace in Somalia. They were endeavoring to eliminate the war economy of Somalia i.e., avoiding the trading of war weapons in Somalia. As a result, many business sectors have begun to participate in civic activities. For example, they were contributing to civic action initiatives such as the Somali Leadership Foundation, which was launched in 2003 to support and reward Somalis who have made important contributions to promoting peace, dialogue and the principles of human rights (International Crisis Group, 2004).

3.2. The Formal Mechanisms

Formally, various peace processes were delivered to solve the Somalia civil war with the help of different States, regional and international organizations. Among the major ones:

3.2.1. The 1993 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

The 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement on national reconciliation was arranged by UN (Bradbury, 1994; Makhubela, 2012). The signatories at the conference were the fifteen political faction leaders, who were the warlords that had been responsible for much of the suffering in Somalia and regarded as criminals by many Somalis. The war lords were invited to the conference as the UNITAF needed to protect its own forces in Somalia. The UN invited

to 250 intellectuals, clan elders, religious leaders, women and artists to participate in conference (ibid).

The Addis Ababa Agreement reaffirmed the 1993 agreement on cease-fire and disarmament and reached an agreement on the formation of transitional mechanisms for the restoration of political and administrative structures. In particular, it agreed upon the formation of: Transitional National Council (TNC), Regional Councils in eighteen regions of the country, Central Administrative Departments to re-establish civil administration etc. (Moller, 2009; Makhubela, 2012).

3.2.2. The 1993 Boroma Peace process

The Boroma peace agreement on national reconciliation provided a solid foundation for the enrichment of the Somaliland secession from the Somali republic (Brabury, 1994; Makhubela, 2012). The Boroma agreement produced a peace charter to strengthen security and regularize the role of the traditional local elders in all aspects surrounding peacemaking (Lewis, 2002; Makhubela, 2012). The Addis Ababa, Arta and Mgagathi peace processes did not make a provision for the structural representation of the clan elders regarding decision making during the peace conferences.

3.2.3. The 2000 Arta Peace Process

In some extent the Arta peace process was influenced by the Addis Ababa peace agreement such as establishing some form of government system (Moore, 2003; Makhubela, 2012).

The Arta peace process was an initiative of the president of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelle in order to establish the Transitional National Government (TNC). IGAD was the under writer of the process though the Ethiopia government worked actively to undermine the outcome of the process due to the perception that Islamists such as Al-Ittihad dominated outcomes (Tadesse, 2002; Makhubela, 2012).

In the Arta peace process about 2000 delegates were attended in the peace process and motivated to create a building of a system of government. As a result, 44 seats were setup and allocated to the main clans that are the Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirfile, and Dir clans (Adar, 2001; Makhubela, 2012). Nevertheless, the TNG did not get a support from the Mogadishu citizens (Lewis, 2008).

3.2.4. The 2004 Mbagathi peace process

The 2004 Mbagathi peace process was initiated by IGAD in 2002. It was the time that the TNG had failed and the Mogadishu warlords were becoming a dominant force threatening the national security of Kenya and Ethiopia. Thus, the agreement was founded on the basis that creating state institutions will transform the Somalia conflict (Lewis, 2008; Makhubela, 2012). The European Union (EU) and the UN were become again the financial sponsors of the peace

process which first took place in the Kenyan town of Eldorent (Menkhaus, 2003; Makhubela, 2012). The Mbagathe peace process established the transitional federal government and Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed became a president. Nevertheless, the government was not effective in controlling the territory (Adam, 2008).

3.2.5. The 2008 Djibouti peace Process

In case of the ineffectiveness and the controversies of TFG I, TFG II established through the Djibouti peace process in 2008. In this peace process it was promised that to strengthen the coalition of moderates from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG I) and opposition groups including many Islamists who signed the Djibouti Peace Agreement in 2008 (Menkhaus, 2009).

IV. THE RESPONSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Due to the severe civil war in Somalia and its effect on the regional and international peace and security, various international actors have provided different responses to calm the situation. So, the paper discussed on few of international actors and their responses.

4.1. The United Nations Intervention

For the first time, the U.N. was involved in peace enforcement that is the armed intervention into a conflict without the prior consent of the state authorities involved in the hostilities. The combination of civil war and humanitarian crises after the state collapsed in 1991, led to the first UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). It was authorized by Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992 (Dagne, 2009; UN, 2014). The UN intervention in Somalia was initially prompted by a desire on the part of the international community to protect food relief, disease and end the famine ravaging southern Somalia. It was initially involving nearly 30,000 troops (Haldén, 2008).

Due to the intensification of the conflict in Somalia, UN Security Council authorized a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to take the security measures. Eventually, UNITAF's mandate was expanded under UNOSOM II in May 1993 to assist Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy (Kidist, 2009; UN, 2014). After UN's withdrew in 1995, it has been providing financial, logistical, and technical assistance to the AMISOM through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to calm the situation in Somalia (ibid).

4.2. The African Union Response

In September 2006, the AU decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia and African Union Mission for Somalia

(AMISOM) was deployed in 2007. The mission was to provide a support to the TFG I in order to stabilize the situations in Somalia and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and for reconstruction and development in Somalia. It is a peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the United Nations under Resolution 1744 (Berouk & Roba, 2011).

AMISOM only deploys troops from Uganda and Burundi, and until 2010 had a combined force of 5250 in Mogadishu. Since its deployment, AMISOM has managed at least to protect the Abdullahi Yusuf and later the Sheikh Sharif administrations (ibid).

4.3. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Response

IGAD has been contributing in preparing a forum for the peace agreements in

order to solve the Somalia civil war. For instance, IGAD initiated the 2004 Mbagathi peace process to establish the Transitional Federal Government I (TFG I) of Somalia. It also played a great role for the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government II (TFG II) in 2008 (Kidist, 2009).

In addition, due to the intensification of the insurgency, IGAD showed its support for the TFG as a legitimate government in Somalia and to be assisted by the other international community. Thus, it pushed for the deployment of the African Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, which was deployed in March 2007(Miti, 2010). IGAD also established a Somalia Facilitator Liaison Office in Addis Ababa in 2008. The Facilitator's Office is mandated to: facilitate reconciliation, assist institutional and capacity building efforts, and assist the mobilization of financial and technical resources for the TFG II (ibid).

4.4. The United States Response

The US has cooperated with the UN mission to protect the Somali from the existing miserable situations. The US initiated the Operation Restore Hope to Somalia and expanded it with cooperation of United Nations in the early 1990s. But due to the 1993 attack against the US and UN forces, the US left out Somalia (Roba & Berouk, 2007). Again, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has been focusing on Somalia as long as Somalia becomes a safe haven place for the terrorist groups and Islamic fundamentalists (ibid). The United States, in response to what they saw as an Islamic fundamentalist threat, formed the Alliance for Restoration for Peace and Counter-Terror in Februrary 2006 (Menkhaus cited in Duke University, 2007; Miti, 2010).

The current involvement of the US in Somalia due to the believe that Somalia has been becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda related groups. In this regard, the US launched attacks in different times. For instance, in January 2007 US launched attack in southern Somalia and killed Al Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who is believed to have been one the master minds of the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam bombings in 1998 (Roba & Berouk, 2007; Miti, 2010).

4.5. The Response of Ethiopia

Ethiopia has provided different responses for the crisis of Somalia. For instance, Ethiopia supported the establishment of Transitional Federal Government in 2004 (TFG I) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG II) in 2008 (Lewis, 2008; Miti, 2010). Following the emergence of fundamentalist groups such as Union of Islamic Court (UIC), in 2006, the Ethiopian forces launched a military attack against the UIC. In few days, the Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu and the UIC dissolved and surrendered political leadership to clan leaders. But still, the Al-Shabaab that is the military wing of the UIC has been attacking against the TFG and other neighboring countries (ICJ cited in Kidist, 2009; Miti, 2010).

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, though Somalia people are homogeneous, since the early 1990s Somalia has been in severe civil war based on the clan and sub-clan level. In the civil war, several Somalia peoples had become victims. There were various causes for the emergence of the Somalia civil war such as clannism, the competition for resource and power, colonial legacy, underdevelopment, availability of weapons etc. These and other factors played a great role for the rising of the severe crisis in Somalia.

Many international actors such as United Nations, African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, United States of America and Ethiopia tried to settle the Somalia conflict. For example, United Nations engaged in Somalia to provide humanitarian support and to bring peace and stability. The informal and formal mechanisms have been delivered to solve the Somalia crisis. For instance, in the formal ways various peace processes such as the 1993 Addis Ababa peace agreement; the 1993 Boroma Peace process; the 2000 Arta peace process; and the 2004 Mbagathi peace process; and the 2008 Djibouti peace process were made. However, the peace agreements did not achieve the expected goals.

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